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**CONCEPTS OF TIME IN HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
IN EUROPE AND ASIA**

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I. Introductory Remarks: Concepts of Time and Idea of Progress

In my report for the 17th International Congress of Historical Sciences¹⁾, I tried to classify the concepts of time in historical writings into eight types: 1. oscillating time, 2. cyclic time, 3. Newtonian linear time, 4. Christian linear time, 5. linear time going upwards, 6. linear time going downwards, 7. time as a series of points, and 8. spiral time.

In discussing the concepts of time in relation to the historical consciousness, it is important to divide the concepts of time into two categories, namely, time as a case to put historical processes in, and time as content, in other words, time which is inherent in the historical process. Time as a case corresponds, it seems to me, to what J. T. Fraser, founder of the International Society for the Study of Time, calls "eotemporality", the root metaphor of which is, according to John A. Michon's article dealing with Fraser's "Levels of Temporality", mechanism, and the representative system of which is, also according to him, clock.²⁾ Speaking of the eotemporal world, Fraser refers to the world of classical physicist's t , where the direction of time has no meaning.³⁾ This t corresponds in the world of history to chronology, which can be measured by clock and calender. The level of temporality of the time as the content of historical process is, without doubt, what Fraser calls nootemporality, the root metaphor of which is, again according to Michon, organicism.⁴⁾ It is important not to confuse these two concepts of time, when we discuss the concepts of time in relation to historical consciousness, namely, time in history. Time as a case, or a container, has in itself nothing to do with progress. It is formal and value-neutral, valuation being inseparable from the time in history.

The second problem is how to construct a theory of "collective" nootemporality. The level of nootemporality has directly to do with personal history. When we discuss the above-mentioned type 5 of the concepts of time, that is, the idea of progress, we have to assume that it is a matter either of a social class, a nation, or human kind as a whole. A person can show progress in his life history. What matters, however, when we speak of the idea of progress is not progress of, for example, a schoolboy in mathematics. What matters here is collective progress. We can examine the idea of progress of one person, for example, of Turgot. The idea of progress cherished by Turgot is an individual representation. But the object of his representation is human kind in general, therefore collective. And his representation may also be representing the representation common in some circle of the French intellectuals of the eighteenth century. It goes without saying that the task to build a theory of collective consciousness, starting from individual consciousness, is a difficult task.

Nevertheless, to discuss the idea of progress as a problem of the study of time, we must somehow try to construct such a theory, though it is beyond my ability and space allotted to me here to go further into this difficult problem. The same problem emerges, when the French historian Jacques Le Goff speaks of the Church's time and the merchants' time in *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages*.⁵⁾

The idea of progress is often thought to be a variation of the Christian linear time. According to my tentative classification, the idea of progress will be classified as the fifth type, namely, as a concept of time going upwards, which is characterized by eternal betterment.

Of the eight types of time concepts I have tried to identify, type 5, contains the idea of progress and is most closely connected with human valuation. So we may assume that to this type of time concept, human consciousness is closely attached, and that such consciousness is mostly historical. Thus it is of interest to try a comparative survey of the idea of progress in Europe and Asia.

Here I would like to discuss the characteristics of the idea of progress by treating it as a sort of historical time model. The idea of progress established itself after the victory of the "Moderns" in the "Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns" in France and England in the seventeenth century and also in the early eighteenth century. In this quarrel, Fontenelle is especially important as the proponent of the "Moderns" and deserves, according to J. B. Bury, the honour of being "the first to formulate the idea of the progress of knowledge as a complete doctrine"⁶⁾. Turgot and Condorcet are two representative thinkers of the idea of progress, both basing their arguments on the development of history. In this connection it will be of interest to trace the influence of the concept of Christian linear time on these ideologues, and to see whether, and if so to what extent, Christian linear time, which is symbolized by a definite line with a beginning, the Creation, and an end, the Final Judgment, was transformed into linear time going upwards with no eschatological end.

Karl Löwith states in his work *Meaning in History* that a careful reading of the discussions in the "quarrel" shows that "their crucial problem was the basic antagonism between antiquity and Christianity, between reason and revelation."⁷⁾ And Löwith says furthermore:

And with the full development of the modern idea of progress into a sort of religion, the assertion of the superiority of the moderns was openly applied to Christianity. Modernity became distinguished from classical antiquity as well as from Christianity. With Condorcet, Comte, and Proudon, the question of whether the moderns have advanced beyond Christianity is no longer serious; the problem is now how to replace and supersede the central doctrines and the social system of the ancient Christians. At the same time, they realized, though only dimly, that the progress of the modern

revolutionary age is not simply a consequence of its new knowledge in natural science and history but that it is still conditioned by the advance which Christianity has achieved over classical paganism. Hence the ambiguous structure of their leading idea of progress, which is as Christian by derivation as it is anti-Christian by implication and which is definitely foreign to the thought of the ancients.⁸⁾

Löwith concludes after analyzing the idea of progress of Turgot, Condorcet, Comte, and Proudon, that the philosophy of history of the French Enlightenment, "far from having enlarged the theological pattern, has narrowed it down by secularizing divine providence into human prevision and progress."⁹⁾ Thus, Löwith suggests that the idea of progress in the Western world was a secularized version of the Christian concept of time, namely, a linear and eschatological concept of time, indicated above as type 4. He seems not to have fully estimated the overwhelming importance of the "Scientific Revolution" achieved by Newton, Boyle, Huygens, and other Western scientists in the seventeenth century. It is almost certain that these great discoveries supported the conviction of the "Moderns" in that dispute. Even the meaning of the word "progress" changed from the original meaning of "progress through space" to "betterment" in the second half of the seventeenth century, as Samuel L. Macey, former president of the International Society for the Study of Time, points out in his essay "Literary Image of Progress".¹⁰⁾

In the article "The Idea of Progress in Recent Philosophies of History", Georg G. Iggers says as follows:

Philosophy of history in the past few decades has undergone a profound crisis in methodology and in its conception of the meaning of history.

Since the Enlightenment, historical thought has been marked by two generally accepted assumptions. First, that the history of man could be understood by an empirico-rational method. Second, that the study of history demonstrated the continuity of man's progressive development. For the past few decades both of these assumptions have been increasingly questioned.

These two assumptions, the idea of progress and the empirico-rational method, while not logically connected, have related origins in time. To be sure, the linear conception of history, a basic component of the doctrine of progress, had its roots in Judeo-Christian messianic thought, which, in contrast to Greek cyclical theories, saw all of human history as one tremendous teleological drama. But the Christian conceptions of history, except perhaps in the case of the Joachites, could hardly be considered philosophic doctrines of progress insofar as within mundane history any qualitative development of sinful mankind was precluded. The idea of progress as well as the empirico-rational approach to history became dominant only with the secularization of the Western intellect in the seventeenth century and the rise of modern science.

Philosophies of history, while differing vastly in their definitions of scope, nature, and end of progress, and of the way in which it comes about, have agreed that the passage of time was generally positively related to qualitative growth and that modern civilization was the highest point of human existence yet attained in a direct development which could be traced back by scientific means—never vigorously applied to be sure—to primitive man. As defined by the Enlightenment philosophers from the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns in the late seventeenth century to Condorcet, the perfectibility of man was viewed as primarily intellectual in nature and the result of conscious intellectual rather than purely immanent social causation. An earthly utopia was possible, not as the inevitable outcome of historical forces, but as the conscious work of rational individuals who, because of man's increasing enlightenment, were able to base society on the foundations of natural law revealed by human reason. Romantic theorists, while rejecting the effectiveness of deliberate action derived from abstract principles, did not, except in a few extreme cases, reject the reality of progressive social change. Writers like Burke, Herder, or Savigny viewed social change rather in terms of organic growth, the outcome of immanent causation. The intellect, instead of being the prime mover of the historical process, was merely one aspect of a total society. Yet even if the proper unit of historical study became a society rather than the totality of mankind, the possibility of a continuity of human history as a meaningful whole was not necessarily denied, as we see in Hegel.¹¹⁾

In China, in contrast to Europe, type 6, namely the concept of linear time going downwards, characterized by perpetual worsening and retrogression, was deeply rooted especially among the intellectuals, as propagated in the tradition of Confucianism. K'ang Yu-wei (1858–1927), the political ideologue of the reform movement of 1898 with great knowledge of Confucian classics, tried to change the pessimistic interpretation of the works of Confucius. According to K'ang Yu-wei, Confucius is thought not to have taught a pessimistic view of history as ceaselessly deteriorating, but has rather taught an optimistic view of history as progressing into the future world of “Ta-t'ung” (Great Unity). K'ang Yu-wei was also influenced by the evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin. By such a reinterpretation of the works of Confucius, K'ang introduced the idea of progress into the Chinese intellectuals. His role is somewhat similar to that of Fontenelle.

In Japan, the role of Fontenelle, and perhaps of Turgot and Condorcet, was played by Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1901), the founder of Keio University in Tokyo. A British Japanologist, Basil H. Chamberlain, once called Fukuzawa “the intellectual father” of many leaders of Japan in the Meiji period (1868–1912).¹²⁾ His autobiography, which was translated into English,¹³⁾ is full of optimistic belief in progress. I should like to make a comparative survey of the two Eastern thinkers, K'ang and Fukuzawa, by discussing their views on history and the future world.

II. Confucian Concept of Time Reversed by K'ang Yu-wei

Because K'ang Yu-wei's ideas are little known outside China, I will try to introduce him by quoting a comparative study of the history of ideas in Japan and China by a Japanese philosopher, Tsuchida Kyoson, *Contemporary Thought of Japan and China*, published in London in 1927. Tsuchida says as follows:

On reading Liang Ch'i Yuei's "History of Political Thoughts of the Early T'sing Dynasty" or Hu Shih's "Outlines of History of Chinese Philosophy" we see the famous ancient philosophers being respectively interpreted from the new contemporary viewpoint. If we turn to inquire which of the expositions of the ancient traditional philosophy requires reinterpretation, we shall find as first in time and importance that of Confucius. The Chinese people regard him almost with religious passion, and always speak of him as "the teacher of all time." He has exercised great importance from antiquity down to the present on every custom, rite, language, and literature, deeply tinging them all with his own thoughts.¹⁴⁾

Tsuchida says further:

K'ang You Wei is a thinker who has endeavoured to interpret Confucianism in accordance with our own times and to seek in it some new meanings. He is one of the most eminent philosophers in modern China as well as a scholar in several branches of learning. But, as a leader, he is not adapted to the people of the Republic of China, but to the overthrown T'sing dynasty. Nevertheless, his argument, with its far-sighted scheme for an ideal society, cannot be neglected. He took for his authority a passage in one of the ancient sages' books, namely, in "The Record of Rites" (*Li Chi*).¹⁵⁾

In the fifth chapter of "The Record of Rites", called "Li-yün" (Evolutions of Rites", K'ang Yu-wei believed that he found "the successive changes of the Three Ages of Confucius, and the real truth of his Great Way." ¹⁶⁾ Fung Yu-lang says in his monumental work *A History of Chinese Philosophy* that K'ang Yu-wei seeks to correlate the Three Ages, as described in the Chinese classic work *Kung-yang Chuan* (Kung-yang Commentary of *Spring and Autums Annals*), namely, the Age of Disorder, the Age of Approaching Peace, and the Age of Universal Peace (T'ai p'ing), with the Small Tranquillity and Great Unity (Ta-t'ung) as described in the chapter "Evolutions of Rites".¹⁷⁾ In his commentary on the "Evolutions of Rites", K'ang Yu-wei says that "the Way of Confucius embraces the evolutions of the Three Ages, Three Sequences, and Five Powers (i.e., Elements). Love, righteousness, propriety,

wisdom, and good faith operates in (successive) cycles in response to the seasons. The cycle of love (jen — Miyake) constitutes the Way of Great Unity; that of propriety constitutes the Way of Small Tranquillity".¹⁸⁾

The translator of Fung Yu-lang, Derk Bodde, makes an important comment on this problem:

In his eagerness to equate the statements in the *Kung-yang Chuan* and the *Evolutions of Rites*, K'ang disregards the fact that the sequence in the former work is evolutionary (Disorder, Approaching Peace, Universal Peace), whereas that in the latter work is devolutionary (Great Unity degenerating into Small Tranquillity).¹⁹⁾

A Japanese researcher of Chinese social thought, Kojima Sukema, Professor of Kyoto University before the Second World War, also points out that the view of history in the *Book of Rites* is one of degeneration from Great Unity into Small Tranquillity.²⁰⁾

In the following passages we see how K'ang Yu-wei tried to change the pessimistic view of history deeply rooted within Confucianism into the optimistic idea of progress by reinterpreting the Chinese classics. In his commentary on the *Analects* of Confucius, he says:

The course of humanity always progresses according to a fixed sequence. From the institution of the clan comes that of the tribe, followed by that of the nation. And from the nation the Great Unification comes to be formulated. (In the political sphere), from the individual man the instituting of tribal chieftains gradually becomes established, from which the relationship between ruler and subject is gradually defined. The ruler-and-subject relationship gradually leads to constitutionalism, and constitutionalism gradually leads to republicanism. (Likewise in the social sphere), from the individual man the relationship between husband and wife gradually comes to exist, from which the relationship between father and son is gradually defined. This father-and-son relationship leads to the loving of the entire human race, which in turn leads gradually to the Great Unity, in which there is a reversion to individuality.

Thus there is an evolution from Disorder to Approaching Peace, and from Approaching Peace to Universal Peace. This evolution proceeds gradually in accordance with the changes which influence it. No matter in what country one looks, the process is the same. By observing the child, one can know the adult and old man; by observing the shoot, one can know (the future tree) when it becomes an arm-span (in circumstances) and finally reaches to the sky. (In the same way) by observing the modifications and accretions of the three successive eras, Hsia, Shang, and Chou, one can through extension (know) the changes in a hundred generations to come.

When Confucius prepared the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, he extended it to embrace the Three Ages. During the Age of Disorder he considered his

own state (of Lu) as the center, treating the rest of the Chinese hegemony as something outside (his scheme). In the Age of Approaching Peace he considered the Chinese hegemony as the center, while treating the outlying barbarian tribes as something outside (his scheme). And in the Age of Universal Peace he considered everything, far or near, large or small, as if it were one. In doing this he was applying the principles of evolution.

Confucius himself was born in the Age of Disorder. But at the present time communications extend throughout the great earth, and Europe and America, through their vast changes, are evolving toward the Age of Approaching Peace. There will be a day when everything throughout the earth, large or small, far or near, will be like one. There will no longer be any nations, no racial distinctions, and customs will be everywhere the same. With this uniformity will come (the Age of) Universal Peace. Confucius understood all this beforehand.²¹⁾

With regard to the above-quoted passage by K'ang Yu-wei, Fung Yu-lan comments:

K'ang Yu-wei writes these words with reference to the passage in the *Analects* (II, 23) in which Confucius says: "The Yin (i.e., Shang) perpetuated the civilization of the Hsia; its modifications and accretions can be known. The Chou perpetuated the civilization of the Yin, and its modifications and accretions can be known. Whatever others may succeed the Chou, their character, even a hundred generations hence, can be known." In this statement, K'ang believes, lies a veiled reference to the theory of the Three Ages.²²⁾

In the voluminous work *A Source Book in Chinese History*, translated and commented by Wing-Tsit Chan, Chan characterized K'ang's thought pertinently. Chan wrote:

Like most Confucianists, K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927) attempted to put Confucian teachings into paractice in government and society. But as no other Confucianist had ever done, he changed the traditional concepts of Confucius, of the Confucian Classics, and of certain fundamental Confucian doctrines for the sake of reform

Whatever conservatism he had, however, was more than offset by his novel concept of historical progress. The theory of three ages is not new. Tung Chung-shu (c.179-c.104 B.C.), for example, great leader of the Modern Script School who had a tremendous influence on K'ang, had propounded it. But K'ang conceived history not as a cycle, as Tung did, but as an evolution. The source of this idea is probably Western, but he insisted on tracing it to Confucius.

He set forth his theory of the Three Ages in his commentary on a passage in the Confucian Classic, the *Book of Rites*, in which Confucius is said to have taught that history progresses from the Age of Chaos to that

of Small Peace and finally to that of Great Unity. K'ang advocated this doctrine not so much as an echo of the new idea of progress as to provide a philosophical foundation for his political reforms. In the 1880's, when he was still a young man, he plunged into reform movements. Together with other scholars, he repeatedly petitioned the emperor to reconstruct China. In 1898, he actually engineered the dramatic Hundred Days Reform. In this reform he was convinced that though China was not ready for the Age of Great Unity, she had to enter upon an Age of Small Peace. Edicts were issued in rapid order to reform the political, educational, economic, and military institutions, modeled after the West, only to be defeated by the conservative Empress Dowager and he had to flee for his life.²³⁾

K'ang Yu-wei's idea of progress is thus based on his unique interpretation of Confucian thought. In the *Book of the Great Unity (Ta T'ung Shu)*,²⁴⁾ he depicted the world to come of the Great Unity. As is often the case with ideas of progress, his idea of progress was imbued with strong utopianism. For Confucius, utopia lay in the past. For K'ang Yu-wei, utopia lies in the future. He tried to change Confucian pessimism into utopian optimism.

III. Fukuzawa Yukichi's Idea of Progress

Fukuzawa Yukichi was born into a small samurai family of the Nakatsu clan in the province of Buzen on the island of Kyushu. In his autobiography he wrote how eager he was to study the Chinese classics:

I changed from two or three different schools, but I studied most under the care of a master named Shiraishi. Under his guidance I made rapid progress, and in four or five years I had no difficulty in studying a good part of the Chinese classics.

Shiraishi Sensei (Master) placed special emphasis on the classics, and so we gave much of our time to the studies of Lun Yu (Analects), Mencius, and all the other books of ancient sages. Especially as our master was fond of Shih Ching and Shu Ching, we often listened to his lectures on these books. Also Meng Ch'iu, Shih Shuo, Tso Chuan, Chan Kuo Ts'e, Lao Tzu, and Chuang Tzu. As for historical books, we had Shih Chi, Ch'ien Hou Han Shu, Chin Shu, Wu Tai Shih, Yuan Ming Shih Lueh, etc.

Of all the books I read at Shiraishi's school, Tso Chuan was my favorite. While most of the students gave it up after reading three or four volumes out of the fifteen, I read all—eleven times over—and memorized the most interesting passages.²⁵⁾

After quoting the last paragraph of this passage from Fukuzawa's autobiography, the Japanese philosopher Kosaka Masataka (1900–1969), comments about Fukuzawa's conversion from the Chinese learning to the Western learning in his intellectual history of Meiji Japan:

As an adult Fukuzawa became a zealous student of Western learning; he also traveled and came in contact with the real life of the West. The difference between East and West made a deep impression upon him. More than anything else, Fukuzawa felt the overwhelming superiority of the West. He attempted to explain this gulf between Eastern and Western civilization historically. It was his feeling that were he just to succeed in clarifying this one point, Japan would be in a better position to attain the high level reached by the West.

Fukuzawa's historical outlook was based on the view of the history of civilization of Guizot and Buckle. In this view history advanced in three stages: from savagery to semi-civilized stage and to civilization. From savagery or nomadic hunting to early agriculture was one stage; the semi-civilized stage was mainly an agricultural feudal stage; civilization was the progressive, scientific stage of modern society. In this view Africa was savage; Turkey, China and Japan were half-civilized; America and Western Europe were civilized. The pattern of progress for Japan should be to leave the half-civilized stage and attain the stage of civilization. It went without saying that Japan should "make Western civilization as its objective." If Japan was to progress, then it had to use the West as its model, since civilization in the West was almost by definition one of unlimited progress.²⁶⁾

For Fukuzawa, progress for Japan and its goal was to modernize with Western civilization as its model. So he showed little nostalgia for Chinese learning from which he made a complete about-face to Western learning. As regards his attitude to Asian countries, his slogan "Datsu-A" (De-Asianizing) is well-known. In his newspaper *Jiji-Shimpo* he published an article on 16 March 1885 and wrote as follows:

Japan does not have the time to wait for neighbouring countries to become educated and to develop Asia with them. Rather she should join the civilized countries of the West in their actions . . . and treat them (i.e. Asian countries) as the West would when she comes into contact with them.²⁷⁾

In his Autobiography, Fukuzawa himself wrote:

From my own observations in both the Occidental and Oriental civilizations, I find that each has certain strong points and weak points bound up in its moral teaching and scientific theory. But when I examine which excels the other as to wealth, armament and general well-being, I have to put the Orient below the Occident. Granting that a nation's destiny depends upon the education of its people, there must be some fundamental difference in the education of the Western and Eastern peoples.

In the education of the East, so often saturated with Confucian teaching, I find two points lacking; that is to say, the lack of studies in "number

and reason'' (su-ri) in material culture, and the lack of independence (dokuritsu-shin) in the spiritual culture . . .²⁸⁾

Concerning Chinese culture, he showed his open antagonism:

It is not only that I hold little regard for the Chinese teachings, but I have even been endeavoring to drive its degenerate influences from my country. It is not unusual for scholars in Western learning and for interpreters of languages to make this denouncement. But too often they lack the knowledge of Chinese which would make their attacks truly effective. But I know a good deal of Chinese, for I have given real effort to the study of it under a strict teacher. And I am familiar with most of the references made from histories, ethics, and poetry. Even the peculiarly subtle philosophy of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, I have studied after hearing my teacher lecture on them. All of this experience I owe to the great scholar of Nakatsu, Shiraishi. So, while I frequently pretend that I do not know much, I often take advantage of the more delicate points for attack both in my writings and speeches. I realize I am a pretty disagreeable opponent of the Chinese scholars—"a worm in the lion's body."

The true reason of my opposing the Chinese culture with such a vigor is my belief that as long as the old retrogressive doctrine of the Chinese school remains at all in our young men's minds, our country can never enter the rank of civilized nations of the world. In my determination to save our coming generation from this detrimental influence, I was prepared even to face, single-handed, the Chinese scholars of the country (Japan) as a whole.²⁹⁾

IV. Soseki and Chaadayev

Though Fukuzawa was an ardent supporter of Westernization of Japan, he kept warning against superficially imitating the West. As early as 1876, he wrote:

East and West have had different customs, and especially different sentiments, for thousands of years. Even when their relative merits and demerits are clear, ancient customs cannot suddenly be interchanged from one country to another. This is all the more true in things which are not yet clearly known what they are. Our judgement for the acceptance or rejection of these customs can only be made after thier nature has been clarified through countless considerations over the years. But nowadays the somewhat better educated reform-minded people, or those who are called 'teachers of enlightenment', are constantly proclaiming the excellence of Western civilization. When one of them holds forth, ten thousand others nod their heads in approval. From teachings about knowledge and morality down to government, economics, and the minute details of daily life, there are none who do not propose emulation of the Ways of the West.

Even those as yet less informed about the West seem to be entirely abandoning the old in favor of the new. How superficial they are in uncritically believing things Western and doubting things Eastern.³⁰⁾

Natsume Kinnosuke (1867–1916), mostly known by his pen name Natsume Soseki, or simply Soseki, was one of the most representative intellectuals in the years after Japan's Restoration in 1868. He studied English literature and made a research stay in London in the years 1900–1902. After resigning from Tokyo Imperial University, he became known as a novelist. He also poured much effort for elaborating the manuscript of his speeches. In his speech delivered in 1911, "Civilization of Modern Japan" (Gendai Nihon no kaika), Soseki expressed his deep concern over the superficial modernization of Japan.

Minamoto Ryoen, Professor Emeritus of Tohoku University in Sendai and Former Professor of International Christian University in Tokyo, discussed about this essay in the intellectual history of Meiji Japan edited by Kosaka Masaaki, in the following way:

This essay, which first appeared as a lecture, begins with a statement concerning general civilization (kaika). Civilization, as stated previously, is a product of the blending of the economizing of passive life forces produced by the stimulus of duty and obligation (discoveries, machine power) and the expenditure of active life forces (pleasure seeking). If we ask who was happier, the men of the previous ages or modern civilized men, we must conclude that in terms of sheer agony of existence the modern civilized man suffers more by far. Formerly the struggle was one over simple survival. In a period of civilization the struggle has moved to a less elemental sphere and is now concerned with things as having to rack one's brains over whether to live under Condition A or Condition B. In the period when elemental question, life or death, was primary, human carvings were extremely small. In the age of civilization, however, even such petty questions as whether to change from jinrikishas to automobiles arise with a certain amount of authority and invite disturbances. It is just as if a low pressure area had suddenly appeared within civilization (bunmei); each area is thrown out of proportion and until equilibrium is once again restored unrest is unavoidable.

Our lives in this kind of a period of civilization cannot but be subject to the onslaughts of anxiety and suffering. However, because the civilization in the West—what Soseki called "general civilization (ippan no kaika)"—is an *internal* (naihatsu-teki) *development* and the civilization in Japan is *externally derived* (gaihatsu-teki), Japan perforce, must suffer twofold agonies. It is Japan's fate that its civilization, which must be transformed into an internal one if it is not to be false, must remain an externally developed one . . .³¹⁾

Minamoto wrote further:

Soseki compared the extreme avidity with which the Japanese abandoned themselves to these developmental processes to a man spirited away by a goblin. In the West when there is a transition from intellectual tendency A to intellectual tendency B, for example, it stems from some internal need. This means that in the West movement to B takes place after the good and bad points of A have been thoroughly experienced and, in a sense, its sweetness and bitterness savoured. “In Japan, which is under the sway of modern civilization, a feeling of hesitation arises because the Japanese feel like hangers-on within the new and old currents bursting in on them from the West.” This rapid transition from A to B, with no breathing spell in between, is like sampling dishes at a banquet and, before being able to feast on these dishes, to have them suddenly withdrawn and replaced by an entirely new cuisine.³²⁾

Soseki said in this lecture:

The Japanese are under the influence of this kind of civilization, and must, consequently, experience feelings of emptiness somewhere along the line. And at someplace or other they must feel a sense of anxiety and dissatisfaction. It is not at all good that there are some who proudly take on airs as if the civilization in Japan had developed internally, from Japan's own resources. There is extreme snobbishness in this. No, it is not at all good. It is both a sham and a deceit.³³⁾

The word civilization corresponds to Soseki's word “kaika”. Usually his word “kaika” is translated as enlightenment, but it is not to be confused with Enlightenment in eighteenth century's France.³⁴⁾ To avoid this confusion, I translate it in this essay as civilization. Soseki's use of the word “kaika” seems to have a nuance of movement into the stage of civilization. It may also be translated as civilizing.

The late professor Yamamoto Shin (1913–1980) of Kanagawa University found some similarity between Soseki's lecture discussed above and the *Philosophical Letters* of the Russian thinker Peter Yakoblevich Chaadayev. Both criticized superficial Westernization. Soseki criticized Westernization in Japan since the Restoration and Chaadayev Westernization in Russia since Peter the Great. Both had a bitter experience of rapid and superficial Westernization common in both non-Western countries such as Japan and Russia.³⁵⁾

Describing Chaadayev's biography, V. V. Zenkovsky points out the importance of Chaadayev's *Philosophical Letters* in the following way:

P. Ya. Chaadayev (1794–1856) had always attracted wide attention on the part of historians of Russian thought. In this respect he had been luckier than anyone else. It is true that the interest in Chaadayev has usually been connected with only one aspect of his creative activity—his scepticism

toward Russia, as expressed in the single 'philosophical letter' which was published during his lifetime. The tumult which arose around Chaadayev when this letter appeared in print (1836) was quite extraordinary. The journal which had published his letter was immediately suspended; Chaadayev himself was officially declared insane and subjected to compulsory medical supervision, which lasted about a year. Chaadayev's unusual fate and his generally remarkable personality gave rise to legends about him even during his lifetime. Herzen included Chaadayev among the 'revolutionaries', though without any reason; others have more than once considered him a convert to Catholicism. For some, Chaadayev is the outstanding representative of the liberalism of the 1830's and '40's; for others he is a mystic. Until very recent times not all of his 'philosophical letters' were known; in 1935 five previously unknown letters appeared, which reveal for the first time Chaadayev's religio-philosophic views (*Literaturnoye nasledstvo* [Literary Heritage] Vols. 22-4, Moscow). In any event, we now possess sufficient material for re-establishing Chaadayev's *system*.

Let us turn first to his biography.

Peter Yakovlevich Chaadayev was born in 1794. Having lost his parents at an early age, he and his brother Michael remained in the care of his aunt, Princess A. M. Shcherbatova (daughter of the eighteenth-century historian and writer whom we have already met), who, together with her brother, Prince Shcherbatov, gave both boys a thorough education. In 1809 Chaadayev entered Moscow University. In 1812 he entered military service and took part in Napoleonic War. In 1816 he met Pushkin—who was still a Lyceum student—and remained one of his closest friends until the end of Pushkin's life. Chaadayev developed very rapidly; at an early age he displayed a firm and direct character and an extraordinary sense of his own dignity. Early in 1821 Chaadayev gave up military service; several legendary stories exist concerning this episode, the real basis of which has not yet been made completely clear. In the years before 1823 Chaadayev underwent his first spiritual crisis—in a religious direction. He had already read a great deal, and at this time he was carried away by mystical literature. Jung-Stilling's works had a particular influence on him. As a result of his extraordinary spiritual intensity his health broke down and he had to go abroad to recuperate. There he remained until 1826—which saved him from destruction, as he was extremely close to the most prominent Decembrists. When Chaadayev returned from abroad, he was arrested but was soon released and permitted to return to Moscow. There he experienced a second crisis. He became a total recluse for several years, immersing himself wholly in complicated intellectual work. During these years of the most complete seclusion (to 1830), Chaadayev's whole philosophic and religious world-view took shape, finding expression in a series of studies (1829), which were written in the form of letters to a fictitious person. It was previously assumed that these letters were written to a Mme Panova, but it has now been shown that this was not the case. Chaadayev simply chose the epistolary form to expound his own views—a quite usual practice at the time. These letters had long passed from hand to hand; and finally

N. I. Nadezhdin, an enterprising journalist and former editor of the magazine *Telescop*, printed one of the letters. This was in 1836; the letter was not printed on Chaadayev's initiative, but with his consent. It created an impression like an exploding bomb. Chaadayev's harsh, relentless judgments of Russia and the dark pessimism of his appraisal of her historical fate astonished everyone. Although the letter had been passed from hand to hand for a long time, it had created no such reaction; but its appearance in print was like a 'shot ringing out in a dark night' (Herzen). A small group of radical young men—like Herzen—was inspired by the audacity of Chaadayev's charges, thrilled by their force and majestic menace; but the immense mass of Russian society took the letters differently. Even the liberal circles were shocked, and in the conservative circles there was extreme indignation. The government, as we have already noted, immediately suspended the journal, banished the editor from Moscow, and dismissed the censor. Chaadayev himself, as he later said, 'got off cheaply'; he was officially declared insane. A doctor came to examine him every day. He was considered under house arrest, and permitted to take a walk only once a day. Within a year and a half, all of these repressive measures were removed—on condition that he 'should not venture to write anything'. Chaadayev remained in Moscow to the end of his life, taking a most active part in all the ideological meetings which were convened by the most remarkable men of the time (Khomyakov, Herzen, K. Aksakov, Samarin, Granovski, *et al.*).³⁶⁾

V. Concluding Remarks

I have discussed the idea of progress developed by two outstanding intellectuals of China and Japan, K'ang Yu-wei and Fukuzawa Yukichi. Because Confucianism was very deeply rooted among Chinese intellectuals, K'ang Yu-wei tried to develop the idea of progress through re-interpreting Confucian classics. And because Confucianism was not so deeply rooted among Japanese intellectuals as in China, Fukuzawa tried to import Western learning and technology to promote Japan's Westernization, thereby opposing the influence of Chinese culture in Japan.

K'ang Yu-wei's example shows that, though China was slow in importing Western learning and technology, Chinese intellectuals succeeded to keep their cultural identity based on the Confucian tradition. In other non-Western countries such as Japan and Russia, the intellectuals felt that they were menaced by the threat of losing their cultural identity. In Russia, Chaadayev's *Philosophical Letters* opened the way for the burning dispute about the identity of Russia. After the publication of his First Letter in *The Telescope* in 1836, the dispute of the Russian intellectuals between the Slavophiles and the Westerners began.³⁷⁾ It was a dispute in search for their cultural identity. Soseki was haunted by a similar problem.

Various concepts of time are developed in various areas of the world. In this report, I confined myself to considering how the idea of progress corresponding to the type 5 of eternal betterment was developed in the Western world and in the non-Western world by taking as examples the Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns in seventeenth century France, the re-interpretation of Confucian classics by K'ang Yu-wei in nineteenth and early twentieth century China, the promotion of Westernization by Fukuzawa Yukichi in nineteenth and early twentieth century Japan, and also the pessimistic views over Westernization of Soseki in Japan and Chaadayev in Russia.

It is surely of much interest to consider how each of these eight types of concepts of time correspond to various cultural areas and historical epochs, respectively. I hope that I will be able to extend my study of the concepts of time to various areas and historical epochs, in days to come. It will be a comparative study of historical consciousness in relation to the concepts of time. Of importance will be to include both Western and non-Western cultural areas for consideration.

NOTES

- (1) Miyake, Masaki, "General Comments on the Concepts of Historical Time", 17th International Congress of Historical Sciences, Methodology 1, Concepts of Time in Historical Writings in Europe and Asia, *Grands Thèmes, Méthodologie, Section Chronologiques 1, Rapports et abrégés*, Comité International des Sciences Historiques (Madrid; Comité Español de Ciencias Históricas, 1990), pp. 134ff. This report was published in a revised form in *Memoirs of the Institute of Social Sciences*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1991.
- (2) John A. Michon, "J. T. Fraser's 'Levels of Temporality' as Cognitive Representations", *Time, Science, and Society in China and West: The Study of Time V* (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), p.59, Table 3.
- (3) Ibid., p. 53.
- (4) Ibid.; Ibid., p. 59, Table 3.
- (5) Jacques Le Goff, *Time, Work and Culture in the Middle Ages*, Translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, Volume 1, Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 107. Cf. Miyake, Masaki, The Concept of Time as a Problem of the Theory of Historical Knowledge, *Nachdenken über Geschichte: Beiträge aus der Ökumene der Historiker in memoriam Karl Dietrich Erdmann*, hrsg. von Hartmut Boockmann und Kurt Jürgensen (Neumünster: Karl Wachholtz Verlag, 1991), p. 336.
- (6) J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth*, Introduction by Charles A. Beard (New York, Dover Publications, 1955, first published by Macmillan Company in 1932) p. 110.

- (7) Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 61.
- (8) Ibid.
- (9) Ibid., p. 103.
- (10) Samuel L. Macey, "Literary Images of Progress", *Time, Science, and Society in China and West*, p. 98.
- (11) Georg G. Iggers, "The Idea of Progress in Recent Philosophies of History", *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (September 1958).
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- (13) Fukuzawa, Yukichi, *The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi*, translated by Eiichi Kiyooka, Third and revised edition (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1940).
- (14) Kyoson Tsuchida, *Contemporary Thought of Japan and China* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1927), p. 193f.
- (15) Ibid., p. 194.
- (16) Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, Volume II, *The Period of Classical Learning*, Translated by Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Paperback, 1983, first published 1953), p. 679.
- (17) Ibid., p. 680
- (18) Ibid., p. 679f.
- (19) Ibid., p. 680, translator's footnote 3.
- (20) Kojima, Sukema, *Chugoku no kakumei shisō* (Revolutionary Thought of China). (Tokyo: Chikuma-shobō, 1967), p. 88. Cf. Nomura, Kōichi, *Kindai Chugoku no seiji to shisō* (Politics and Thought of Modern China), (Tokyo: Chikuma-shobō, 1964), pp. 115–118.
- (21) Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., p. 680f.
- (22) Ibid., p. 681f.
- (23) Wing-Tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, Translated and Compiled by Wing-Tsit Chan (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 723–725.
- (24) See Laurence G. Thompson, *Ta T'ung Shu: The One-World Philosophy of K'ang Yu-wei*: Translated from Chinese with Introduction (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958).
- (25) Fukuzawa, *The Autobiography*, p. 8.
- (26) Kōsaka, Masaaki (ed.), *Japanese Thought in the Meiji Era*, translated by David Abosch (Tokyo: Pan Pacific Press, 1958), p. 72. In quoting a minimum grammatical change was added by Miyake.
- (27) Kato, Shuichi, *A History of Japanese Literature*, 3. *The Modern Years*, Translated by Don Sanderson (Tokyo/New York/London: Kodansha International, 1990, First published by Paul Norbury Publications in 1979), p. 84.
- (28) Fukuzawa, *The Autobiography*, p. 229.
- (29) Ibid., p. 230f.
- (30) Fukuzawa, Yukichi, *An Encouragement of Learning*, translated with an Introduction by David A. Dilworth and Hirano, Umeyo (Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1969), p. 95.
- (31) Kōsaka, Masaaki (ed.), *Japanese Thought in the Meiji Era*, p. 445f.

- (32) Ibid., p. 446.
- (33) Ibid., p. 447.
- (34) Miyake, Masaki, “The Idea of Progress: Modernization and Westernization in Japan in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries and a Comparison with Russia’s Case”, *The Bulletin of the Institute of Social Sciences, Meiji University*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1993. p. 11f.
- (35) Yamamoto, Shin, “Ohka no sōtai teki hansei: Chaadayev to Sōseki” (Total Reflections on Westernization: Sōseki Natsume and Peter Chaadayev), *Bulletin of the Institute of Humanities, Kanagawa University*, No. 8, August, 1974, Japanese with English summary. This English summary is quoted in: Miyake, “The Idea of Progress”, p. 13f.
- (36) V. V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy*, translated by George L. Kline (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953), pp. 148–150.
- (37) Katsuda, Kichitarō, *Kindai Roshia seiji shisō shi* (History of Political Ideas in Modern Russia), (Tokyo: Sōbun-sha, 1961), p. 72.

For Japanese names I follow the Japanese practice of writing the family names first, and, in the notes, I write the Japanese family names first and put a comma before the first names. The signs for the long vowel, such as ō, are used only in the notes, not in the text.

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